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SIGNIFICANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMMIS-
SIONS IN THE GROWTH OF THE LAW
By JAMES M. LANDIS*
About two months ago, it was my privilege to be in Indiana
to address a meeting of the Associated Harvard Clubs in
Indianapolis. It was after, rather than before, that talk, that
I was asked to come here to talk to the Indiana State Bar
Association. That, as you can readily see, enhances tremen-
dously the privilege of being here tonight. For Josh Billings
once said that everybody has to take a chance of being bitten
by a mad dog once, but, if the dog is really mad, nobody goes
back for a second bite. So when Judge Treanor asked me to
come here, I took it that I had, at least, the absolution of
the Supreme Court of Indiana. And to many of us in govern-
ment these days the absolution of any court is an event of some
significance.
In these last four years that I have spent with government,
I have rarely had the opportunity to talk to a group of law-
yers. True, there has been both the necessity and the oppor-
tunity to talk to groups of financial lawyers, whose bread and
butter came from struggling to master the new law that we
were making. But these were technical talks, where the me-
chanics of administration overshadowed the philosophy under-
lying the larger objectives. Tonight, however, I shall refuse
to be technical. And also, not yet having returned to the
professional life, I am privileged not to be profound.
Instead I want to take you on an inquiry, where, perhaps,
the best we can do is to raise questions rather than find an-
swers. And my inquiry concerns the relationship of our
traditional concepts of law and the processes of adjudication
to the processes of administration.
*Address of Hon. James M. Landis, Retiring Chairman Securities and
Exchange Commission, and Dean Elect of Harvard Law School, at the Annual
Meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association, July 9, 1937.
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I start with a few simple facts that concern the govern-
mental unit known as the administrative commission. Its
origin, as you know, is of comparatively recent date. In the
federal government we begin in 1887 with the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Just as utilities are and have been
a pressing problem of the last quarter of a century-a problem
that every political party has had to wrestle with-railroads
was one of the major problems of the latter part of the nine-
teenth century. Out of its attempted solution, the adminis-
trative commission was born.
We will do well to trace this movement briefly. Following
the railroad issue, the nineties began the task of trying to fit
the new aggregations of capital, made possible largely by
the use of the corporate device, into the warp and woof of our
society. Relying first on the ordinary processes of the crim-
inal law, as was done in the Sherman Act, some twenty years
later an effort was made to supplement these by recourse to the
administrative process and another commission-the Federal
Trade Commission-came into existence.
But we need a little more history to point up our problem.
When the panic of 1907 demonstrated the inherent weaknesses
present in our credit structure, again we became convinced
that some enduring solution to that problem had to be de-
vised and again we turned to a form of administrative com-
mission, the Federal Reserve Board. When the possibilities
of conserving the "white coal" of the nation by orderly de-
velopment became apparent, the Federal Power Commission
came into existence. Out of the necessities of the World
War, the United States Shipping Board was born, later to
concentrate upon the problems of our ocean born traffic that
were so dramatically brought to the forefront in that crisis.
When by 1927 the air as a medium of communication became
of immense importance, in an effort to bring some order in
the claims that individuals were making upon that medium,
we created the Federal Radio Commission.
Since 1933, this movement has naturally grown apace, as
the fertile forcing ground of the depression brought into
sharp relief the necessity for seeking some solution to prob-
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lems that had already been pressing since the War. Thus
we have, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the National Labor Relations Board, the Bituminous
Coal Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, the Social Security Board, the proposed commission to
deal with wages and hours of labor, to say nothing of the
strengthening and reorganization of some of the older com-
missions. Here and there, it is true, that a few of the new
regulatory functions of government have been handled
through the routine of the existing governmental depart-
ments, -sometimes because the problem seemed to have essen-
tially a small compass, such for example as meat inspection
or plant quarantine, or sometimes, as was true of the regula-
tion of stockyards, because political pressures were such as
to place regulation in the hands of an agency then deemed
more amenable to the interests of those who were to be
regulated.
This same development of administrative technique has
taken place in the states as well as the federal government.
There, also, as the public finally determined to put itself in
the driver's seat with reference to some of the major problems
of its life, it created these new mechanisms of administration
to serve its ends.
If we call the roll of the functions that administrative
agencies today serve, one is struck both by the territory that
they cover and by the fact that their creation represented
an apex of public agitation concerning the greater problems
of the past fifty years. Indeed, it is difficult to think of issues
of greater practical concern to our daily life than those that
related to railroads, shipping, banking, utilities, securities mar-
kets, communication, labor relations, monopolistic and unfair
practices, old age and unemployment insurance. To put the
picture in less of a political and more of a juristic setting, it
is worthwhile to attempt to portray the rights for which ordi-
nary citizens now look to administrative agencies for protec-
tion. A partial catalogue of these rights would include such
mundane but important matters as the continuity of our radio
programs, the security of our bank deposits, the safety of our
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life insurance, our protection against fraud and chicanery
in the sale of securities, our necessity for having light and
power at reasonable rates, our protection against discrimina-
tion in railroad tariffs, or as workmen, our protection against
unfair discrimination in employment or our right to compen-
sation for indstrial accident.
The outstanding characteristic of these rights, which today
seek their prime protection from administrative agencies, is
that they spring out of the necessities of modern civilizaton.
Light and power, for example, were unknown not only to
the pioneer but to the urbanite of a century ago. Cheap rail-
road travel only becomes a concern when, due to our changing
mode of life, it becomes the only practical method for over-
land transportation of goods. Until the use of the corpora-
tion made possible nation-wide participation in the ownership
of huge plants and property, control over the issuance and
sale of securities could be left to the common law of deceit
and warranty. In other words, these rights are the liberties
peculiar to modern civilization, and the agencies of their pro-
tection are administrative rather than judicial.
Many of you will recall Sir Henry Maine's famous gen-
eralization about the three factors that made for growth in
the law, namely, fiction, equity and legislation. To these
three, it seems clear that one can now add a fourth-the
administrative agency.
Before examining into the causes that made and still make
for the growth of administrative law, it is worthwhile trying
to generalize about its characteristics. Generally speaking,
administrative agencies are indigenous in the sense that each
springs from efforts to grapple with a particular phase of our
national life. They concern themselves, as I have said, with
concrete problems such as railroads, securities markets, utili-
ties, and the like. Unlike courts to which general law is
committed for enforcement, each administrative agency limits
its operation to a limited business or professional field. Em-
powered, for example, as the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission is to deal with fraud in the sale of securities, it is not
concerned with fraud in the sale of other articles. True, the
SIGNIFICANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONS
general principles applicable to fraud are given particularized
application in the field of securities, but the Commission is
authorized to impose rules of conduct whose principles do not
by the force of analogical reasoning govern conduct in fields
beyond its jurisdiction. As distinct from courts of general
jurisdiction, specialization seems an essential characteristic of
its creation.
A second characteristic of these agencies and the law they
administer is the grant to them of limited legislative powers.
The area of these powers varies with the complexity of the
subject matter with which they deal. Sometimes their legis-
lative functions are something akin to the limited legislative
functions which courts exercise in promulgating rules for the
ordinary disposition of business before them. In other cases,
however, administrative agencies possess broad legislative
powers enabling them to shape policies within the scope of the
general standards enunciated in their legislative grants.
A further characteristic of these agencies is the new and
novel sanctions given to them to carry out their policies.
Those possessed by courts have been limited to relatively few
in character. But the very creation of an administrative
agency implies a consideration of new sanctions in aid of en-
forcement. For example, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission is armed with sanctions never possessed by courts,
but commonly vested in the governing boards of stock ex-
changes, such, for instance, as suspending and expelling mem-
bers from exchanges or suspending securities from being
traded in on exchanges.
A fourth characteristic of these agencies is their power to
initiate action against those who act in violation of the law.
Here, of course, they add to their other functions that of
prosecutor, seeking to insure observance of the laws com-
mitted to them.
One further characteristic is worth notice. That is the
attempt to insure some continuity in their policies by seeking
to remove them to a degree from the ordinary pressures of
political life. In seeking to make them different to a degree
from the ordinary political agency, the hope seems to have
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been that the policies that they have been authorized to pursue
will survive the ordinary vicissitudes of politics.
From an examination of these characteristics, one can
discern the reasons for the phenomenal growth of adminis-
trative law. Foremost among them, I would put the demand
for specialization. It is too much to expect one man to dispose
wisely of all the many kinds of current controversies, even
though he be implemented by all the normal techniques of
the law. And yet this is, in essence, the method of govern-
ment which prevailed in our law until less than a hundred
years ago. Except for the casual and sporadic intervention
of the legislature, the weighing of the various claims of indi-
viduals and of society was left with the nisi prius judge, sub-
ject to such review as might be given by an appellate tribunal.
It is small wonder that law failed to realize the comman man's
hopes in many fields. On occasion a judge with rare ex-
perience would succeed in bringing order out of a new field
of human activity, as, for instance, when Lord Mansfield cre-
ated the law of bills and notes out of the customs of London,
a few principles of common law and some borrowings from
Rome. But by the end of the nineteenth century, when one
considers the burdens already present on the judges, it is not
surprising that there should have arisen a demand for expert-
ness and an essential limitation of endeavor, leaving to the
general jurisdiction of the courts a duty to review the work
of the expert agency for departure from broad standards of
fairness and equity. Rather than resent a division of labor
of this character, the legal profession should in my judgment
welcome it, since it affords adequate time and opportunity
for courts to handle the type of business in which they are
adept and for the just disposition of which they are so neces-
sary. A proper coordination between this work and the work
of the expert tribunals can be effectuated through the processes
of judicial review.
Fields still exist in the law where in my judgment the initial
shaping of the law by persons whose function is continuous
concern with that particular problem would be advantageous.
Judges of general jurisdiction can perforce only give these
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problems sporadic attention as the accident of litigation
brings one phase of the board problems within their jurisdic-
tion. For example, the problem of labor relationships in its
manifold phases suffers considerably from lack of adequate
definition of rights and responsibilities,-a definition impos-
sible of formulation merely by legislation but capable, I be-
lieve, of being pricked out coherently and justly by men ready
to devote their lives to the task. Much of the same situation
exists in the field of corporate reorganization, where elucida-
tion of concepts of fairness and equity is still scant and ob-
scure. Equally true is this in the field of corporate promotion,
where the less meteoric character of a country which has
emerged from the prodigal pioneering period compels a shift
from the hazards of speculation to an attempt to emphasize
safety of principal and stability of return. We have yet in
this country to find a basic philosophy not only as to the allow-
able extent of the promoters' profits but even as to his dis-
closure of these profits to those whom he invites to become
partners in his enterprise.
The second characteristic of the administrative agency that
I mentioned was its possession of limited legislative powers.
The need for an institution with power of this character is
two-fold. The increasng social interdependence of modern
life has made regulatory activity an increasing feature of
government. Forces that once could go unrestrained have
demonstrated their capacity for harm in such vivid fashion
that the safety of great portions of our public demands cer-
tain restraints. These restraints must be preventive in char-
acter. Mere compensation such as legal redress affords is too
frequently futile. An Ivar Kreuger is more to be feared than
a runaway locomotive, and is creative of damage for which
there can be no adequate redress. The demand for rules of
conduct is too intense for a legislature to satisfy, so that in
the nature of things there must be delegation. Furthermore,
the administrative agency can employ the legislative power
delegated to it to write plain and clear the patterns pricked
out by its own adjudication of great numbers of concrete
cases. Into regulations governing accounting, for example,
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has gone the substance of a multitude of individual decisions.
Into tax regulations flow an infinite number of decisions. It
is the scarcity rather than the planitude of this aspect of
regulation that should be deplored. The scarcity springs from
lack of time or lack of surplus professional attainment, for
frequently more difficult than the process of decision is the
process of concisely articulating the net balance of such efforts.
Even in the field of administrative law, as well as court
law, imaginative creation of effective sanctions has been lack-
ing. Hardly a judge that I know has not bewailed this lack.
In the field of penal administration we are slowly beginning
to think in terms other than mere fine and imprisonment. In
the civil field great strides were made a century ago in the
shaping of the equitable remedy of injunction. Its possibilities,
as limited by tradition, seem near to exhaustion. Reason for
the growth of the administrative agency lies in part in the
greater choice of weapons that it possesses in this connection.
The right to revoke a license, the right to require further
reserves as a condition of continuing in business, the right to
require indemnity as a condition precedent to action, the
creation of a competing force, these are samples of some of
the sanctions that have been granted. A notable device, full
of potential danger and yet possessing enormous force, is
that simply of publicity. The reliance is placed there upon
those moral and social sanctions that restrain individuals
from doing openly what they would not hesitate to do were
they permitted to keep the fact a secret. A searching analysis
of the potentialities as well as dangers of this device has still
to be made.
A further characteristic of the administrative agency that
I mentioned was its power to initiate action. This power has
been likened to the function now exercised by the district
attorney. That analogy, however, I believe, is highly super-
ficial. The district attorney is almost exclusively an officer
for the enforcement of the criminal law, whereas an adminis-
trative proceeding, although the moving party in it is the
government, is primarily civil in character.
As such it fulfills a need long felt in our law. For the
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ordinary individual without means the cost of maintaining
litigation in a complex case is such that he foregoes it. To
take an illustration from our own field, the small investor
who sincerely wishes to oppose a plan of reorganization
sponsored by the management is practically helpless. Even
if he can succeed in organizing a small minority committee,
the cost of making the type of investigation necessary to
convince a judge of the inequity of the proposed plan is
such as to be beyond his means. What usually happens is
that his only hope lies in badgering management to give him
as an individual preferential terms. Contrast this situation
with that under the supervision of an administrative agency.
The plan is explored independently from the ground up. If
there is any merit in one small investor's claim, his mere state-
ment of it will bring him the support of expert assistance.
The agency explores his claims not because it is his but be-
cause of its interest in the great class of individuals of whom
he is one. Or to take another illustration, an investor be-
lieves that some manipulation is taking place in his stock.
For him to gather the information upon which a provable
claim of that character could be made is substantially im-
possible. Even though the offense is criminal in character, a
mere complaint of that character directed to the district
attorney's office could not by force of circumstances receive
attention. What concerns the investor is that the conduct
of which he complains should cease. And yet, in the hands
of an administrative agency, a complaint of that character
would be probed to determine whether any reasonable cause
for believing it to be true exists. In substance, a device is
created to furnish legal aid and assistance to groups of indi-
viduals powerless themselves to act and incapable of being
welded together into a unit substantial enough to bear the
burden of litigation.
Jhering, in his famous essay on the struggle for law, de-
tails how the carving out of new rights has been accomplished
by the effort of individuals who were willing to be martyrs
to their conception of what the law should be. Pym and
Hampden in English law are, of course, exemplary of this
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thesis. But there are others less well known, because their
contributions were less spectacular. In many fields, however,
the place of individuals of this character is being taken by
the cooperative public effort of the administrative agency.
In its field, to use Jhering's phraseology, it must eternally
be struggling for law and thus bring a dynamic force into
law, and seek as well to make that struggle not merely casual
but expressive of a basic philosophy towards its problems.
To draw an illustration from the early history of the Federal
Trade Commission, it was of profound social consequence
that that Commission continued to adhere to a sound philoso-
phy of unfair trade practice, instead of being discouraged by
a series of judicial setbacks. Its philosophy in many aspects
was finally to prevail, partly because the courts were eventually
convinced of the correctness of its position, and partly because
Congress through legislation adopted the position that the
experience of the Commission had led it to take.
I shall touch only for a minute on a characteristic of the
administrative agency that I adverted to before, namely,
the grant to the agency of some degree of independence from
political influences. A recent commentator on the subject
has attributed the fashion of creating independent commis-
sions to the fact that they exercise in part judicial functions.
That, he argues, has led subconsciously to an effort to build
them in part upon the analogy of courts with definite tenure
and freedom from removal except for cause.
Without attempting to argue the desirability of the inde-
pendent administrative agency as presently constituted, it
seems to me that an equally important reason for their crea-
tion along a well definable pattern has been the desire for
a certain continuity of administrative policy. As important
as the efficient and independent discharge of their judicial
functons, is their freedom in matters of administration from
minor political disturbances. From major political and social
trends they cannot and should not be immunized. But two
things flow from their present patterning. Unquestionably,
whereas the ebb and flow of political dominance has on
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occasion brought about an equal ebb and flow in the policies
of the executive departments, the administrative agencies have
pursued a more even course. Secondly, a concept of profes-
sional service in the sense of treating government as a career
has featured their makeup. Perhaps it is the creation of this
spirit that is of the most consequence, so that in the final
analysis it will be seen that the term "independence" is but
synonymous with the professional attitude of the career man
in government.
I trust that you will not construe these remarks as a cham-
pionship of administrative justice as contrasted with judicial
justice. My effort has been simply to describe some of the
salient features of a phenomenon which I believe is as sig-
nificant to the growth of the law as was the institution of the
courts of equity. Its lacks, its wants are apparent on every
hand. But at the same time one must recognize the seeds
of strength in it. Its implications for the traditional methods
of legal adjudication cannot be ignored. Its increasing cham-
pionship of the rights and the new liberties of masses of
individuals is certain to give it a foundation of great strength.
Intrinsc to the next few decades of law will be the study of
this phenomenon with the effort to shore up its weaknesses,*
to work out a more adequate modus vivendi between it and
the courts; to systematize its adjudications so that they form
a national and fair system of law. These challenges are par-
ticularly significant to the legal profession. The adminis-
trative process like the legal process will be committed to their
charge. How well that responsibility will be met, will depend
as I see it partly upon the foresight of the legal profession
to understand the new liberties of today's world, and partly
upon its sympathy and readiness to create and refashion
mechanisms of justice that will make these new liberties
effective,
